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SUMMARY
We believe that we can extend program analysis tool to improve software security via
verifying the given safety properties. The work done for this thesis is at the intersection of
programming languages and security which is called software security.
In this work, we have designed and developed an automated static program analysis
tool which can check whether the given program satisfies the required safety properties for
the Java bytecode. Using the combination of model checker and symbolic execution with
lazy abstraction, we have been successful to validate whether a program satisfies the given
properties or not.
Our focus is to automatically prove or disprove whether a given JVM bytecode program
satisfies the required properties. We have developed a property verification tool for Java





Software behaviour can be automatically analyzed and verified with respect to the given
properties like safety, correctness etc. via program analysis [1]. Through program analysis,
it is possible to automate software testing. Furthermore, program analysis have many
applications in security such as bug finding, vulnerability detection, malware analysis and
so forth.
In this section, the different approaches and techniques are described to accomplish
the aforementioned purposes. Several techniques have been proposed and developed for
property verification. The rest of this chapter will introduce the various techniques used to
perform program analyses with dynamic analysis (program execution in environment) or
static analysis (source code or bytecode).
1.1.1 Dynamic program analysis
Dynamic program analysis is a popular technique to analyze properties of programs per-
formed at run-time. Dynamic program analysis offers many advantages like automated
and continuous testing and reporting which reduces the cost of the test and maintenance.
Dynamic program analysis provides many advantages including, but not limited to the list
below:
• It can be performed on the applications which you cannot access either the source
code or the bytecode. For example, a remote web services or web applications can be
tested via dynamic program analysis.
• It can detect the vulnerabilities caused by environment or configuration other than the
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application itself.
• It does not depend on the application environment such as programming language
unlike static program analysis. For example, static analysis tool mostly targets a
specific programming language such as Java or C/C++ source code and sometimes
bytecode. However, applications written in different languages can be tested with
same dynamic program analysis tool. For example, a web service provides same
functionality written in different languages can be analyzed with one dynamic analysis
tool.
Since analysis requires program execution on a real or virtual processor, effectiveness
and coverage of dynamic program analysis depends on the test cases and inputs provided.
The disadvantages of the dynamic program analysis are including, but not limited to the list
below.
• Dynamic program analysis cannot guarantee the full coverage of the software (limited
to inputs or test-cases provided); therefore it cannot address everything lacks in the
aspect of security.
• The common perception about dynamic analysis is it is usually applied at later phases
of development life cycle than static code analysis. Thus, cost and time for fixing the
vulnerability is more than in earlier phases.
1.1.2 Static program analysis
Unlike dynamic approach, static program analysis does not require executing the program.
Static program analysis can perform analysis using something close to either source code or
object code. Since our target programming language is Java, we have developed our tool to












• Static program analysis can determine facts that hold over program states in all
possible runs.
• Static program analysis can detect the unreachable code, unused variables, uncalled
functions.
We have chosen to implement our tool using static analysis techniques because our aim
is to verify the correctness of a given program for the corresponding formal specification.
Fig. 1 shows that our static analysis tool – SAVERIA– takes JVM bytecode and user specified
safety property as inputs, and proves/disproves whether the bytecode satisfies the safety
property with the help of theorem prover. Using combination of static analysis techniques
listed below, we have been able to practically prove whether the program satisfies the formal
specification. If the formal specification is not satisfiable by the program behaviour, we
can disprove the correctness of the software by generating an input on which he program
performs an error.
Model checking is a technique to verify the correctness of systems with respect to the
given model formula in temporal logic. Normally, model checkers are used for the finite-
state systems because they exhaustively explore and check all the possible paths. This
situation can cause bloating and prevents them from using in infinite-state systems.
Symbolic execution is an approach to determine how the inputs affect the program exe-
cution behaviour. Symbolic execution treats inputs as symbolic values instead of assigning
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actual values.
Lazy abstraction is a paradigm which enumerates the paths on demand. Instead of
exhaustively search then refining abstract model, lazy abstraction proposes to refine the
single abstract model if required [2].
Lazy symbolic model checking is a technique to apply model checking on infinite-state





In this chapter, we describe a brief overview of our technical approach to design our static
model checker for Java bytecode to verify given safety properties with safety invariants. By
design principles, this model checker should be easily extensible to complexity verification
and DoS attack vulnerability detection for library written in Java programming language.
SAVERIA supports many programming languages features such as unbounded inputs, un-
bounded multi-dimensional arrays, library objects and inter-procedural calls (including
recursions).
2.1 Overview
SAVERIA is a lazy interpolant-based infinite-state symbolic model checker for Java
applications using counter-example model checker approach [2, 3]. To briefly present the
algorithm, we walk through on a simple Java code fragment in Fig. 2a which has been
inspired by the previous works on lazy abstraction paradigm [2, 3]. We can assume that
upon entering the loop in the code fragment, the L is always free because if the L is acquired
by some other process, acquireLock() function will wait till the L is freed. We want to
demonstrate how SAVERIA can prove that the code fragment will always release the Lock –
L – on leaving the loop in the code fragment in Fig. 2a when par1 > 0.
{par1 > 0} SAFELOCK {L = 0} (1)
Our safety property for SAVERIA to prove the correctness of the program is L = 0 where
the precondition is par1 > 0 in Eqn. 1. Fig. 2b is the corresponding control-flow graph
(denoted CFG) of the source code in Fig. 2a. The vertices in the CFG represents the control
5
1 // SafeLock function takes
2 // two integers par1 and par2
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(b) CFG of SafeLock
Figure 2: A simple Lock example
locations in the source code. SAVERIA takes the CFG and unwinds it into the path-invariant
trees as shown in Fig. 3. An path-invariant tree is formed by the paths of a program labeled
with the path invariants to decide the path reachability [5]. Our path-invariant tree is rooted
at error location, and each path in the tree is a path from the initial location to the error
location. Each vertex labeled as FALSE by default except for the initial location which is
labeled as TRUE. Upon reaching the entry point for the loop, SAVERIA weakens the path
invariants for each control location and merges the labeled path into the path-invariant
tree. Having a FALSE invariant for the error location means that the erroneous path is
unreachable; hence, SAVERIA proves that the program satisfies the given safety property.
First, SAVERIA uses Soot [6] for control-flow construction and to lift the bytecode to a
Static Single Assignment (SSA) intermediate representation. In SSA form, each variable
assigned exactly once which makes easier to establish the logical equivalences during static
program analysis. Then, SAVERIA takes the CFG and unwinds it into the path-invariant tree
which contains the expanded single path traces.
ERR vertex represents the program state which is inconsistent with safety property.
SAVERIA starts unwinding process with expanding the ERR vertex using breadth first search
(BFS). SAVERIA maintains an expansion queue to store expanded vertices. Each created
vertex is pushed into the expansion queue, and SAVERIA pops the first vertex in the expansion
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queue to expand the path leading to it. Therefore, the first path explored is the shortest
path to the ERR vertex – the path which skips the loop shown in Fig. 3a. To show that this
particular path is not feasible, we have to prove that the ERR is unreachable via labeling
as FALSE in this single execution path. To generate path invariants for a given path, we
have leveraged Interpolant Theorem Prover [7]. An interpolant for a given path is a path
invariant for each control location starting with TRUE for initial location and FALSE for
the ERR vertex. Therefore, having a FALSE invariant for any control location in any single
execution path means that the control location and the rest of the path is unreachable which
implies the path is infeasible (see Defn. 1). Note the inconsistency between the assumption
par1 > 0 and the control location (line 4). To skip the body of for loop, the variable par1
should be equal to 0. However, our assumption is par1 is greater than 0. After generating
interpolants, SAVERIA weakens the invariants along the path and labels the ERR vertex as
FALSE in Fig. 3a.
SAVERIA resumes expansion at the vertex 1 (line 4). It is currently the only available
condition location which has unexplored branch leading another execution path. The shortest
path now executes the loop once, but skips releasing the lock (line 9) via jumping to the head
of the if statement (line 8). Again, all the vertices are labeled with FALSE invariant except
for initial location for this single execution trace. To skip the body of if statement (line 9),
the if condition should not hold. On this particular path, the if condition (line 8) does not
hold which is quite opposite of our assumption. Since there is inconsistency between the
assumption and the rest of the path after the control location at vertex 4 (line 8), the rest of
the path is weakened with FALSE invariant. Upon refutation of the path (proving the ERR
location is unreachable), this path is merged in to the path-invariant tree as shown in Fig. 3b.
The vertices 5 and the 1 corresponds to the same program control location (line 4). There are
currently two vertices which have unexplored branches – 3 (end of if statement at line 8) and
5 (line 4). Since the vertex 3 has explored before the vertex 5, the vertex 3 takes place before



































































Figure 3: Unwinding CFG into Interpolant Tree
CFG with expanding the other branch leading to the vertex 3. This time, the expanded path
will take the path releasing the lock (line 9). This makes L = 0 in the final program state.
However, the final state for erroneous path is L 6= 0 in CFG (Fig. 2b). Once again, error path
is infeasible. The path and the invariants along the path are showed in Fig. 3c
At the final stage, the vertices 1 and 5 correspond to the same control location (line 4).
In Fig. 3, the dashed line means that the path invariant at vertex 1 implies the path invariant
at vertex 5. Using this implication relation, we can say that vertex 1 covers the vertex 5. As
long as this implication relation holds, SAVERIA will not expand the other branches leading
into the vertex 5 . The vertices 4 and 7 also represent the same control location (line 8).
Fig. 3c also shows that the path invariant at vertex 4 implies the path invariant at vertex 7. If
this relation will not be broken in future, the vertex 7 will not be expanded into the other
branches. While SAVERIA explores the vertices in the CFG, it puts the explored ones in
to the expansion queue. SAVERIA pops the next vertex, and continues to the expansion if
and only if it has an unexplored branch and it has not covered by any other vertex. Finally,
expansion queue is empty; in other words, there isn’t left any vertex which is not covered
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and doesn’t have unexplored branch. As a result, SAVERIA finds no path which leads to the
error location. Fig. 3c contains the path-invariant tree which is the proof for the correctness
of the program.
2.2 Foundations
SAVERIA depends on Craig interpolants to reason about the correctness of the program.
2.2.1 Interpolants
SAVERIA refines the path invariants using interpolants generated by an interpolating theorem
prover upon refutation of the program paths [3, 8]. To understand our approach, first we
will present how an interpolant works in First Order Logic and what it means in terms of
verification.
Definition 1. For the given two well formed formulae ϕA and ϕB in some logic, if ϕA
∧
ϕB
is inconsistent, there is a reverse interpolant ϕI in the context with the following properties
• ϕI includes only the common non-logical symbols of both ϕA and ϕB
• ϕA |= ϕI
• ϕB |= ¬ϕI
Example 1. For all x, y and z, let ϕA = x ≤ y ∧ y < z and ϕB = x− z − 5 > 0. Then we
have the following properties ϕA |= x ≤ z and ϕB |= ¬(x ≤ z). One interpolant for these
two formulae is ϕI = x ≤ z where ϕB ∧ ϕI is inconsistent.
The use of interpolants in program analysis relies on the inconsistency detection. Having
a FALSE invariant for a single execution path in the CFG means that there are at least two
formulae which are inconsistent with each other as shown in Ex. 1. In verification, this
means the current execution trace is infeasible; therefore, the path does not satisfies the
formal specification in the abstract model. SAVERIA proves or disproves the correctness of
a system using interpolants described in the Defn. 1.
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2.2.2 Path-invariant tree based lazily symbolic model checking
Our approach is to prove infeasibility of a path via refuting the path using interpolation
based theorem prover [8] which generates an interpolant for each occurrence of a control
location and for the error location. Refutation of a path happens upon generating FALSE
invariant for any of the control location or for the error location. If there exists any FALSE
invariant for any location along the path, the rest of the locations on the path also labeled as
FALSE. Upon refutation, SAVERIA merges this trace into the traces tree. While merging
each refuted path, the disjunction of the interpolants for the same control location is assigned
as the invariant for the location. If there exists such a path which error location cannot be
labeled with FALSE invariant, the path is feasible. Upon reaching a feasible path, SAVERIA
decides the program satisfies the given properties if there exists such a single trace which
error location cannot labeled with FALSE invariant.
The interpolants generated by the theorem prover for the corresponding control locations
are used for the cover relation. The main benefit of the lazy abstraction paradigm applying on
symbolic model checking is to enable model checking on infinite-state systems. Instead of
unwinding each vertex, SAVERIA unwinds only the uncovered vertices in the path-invariant
tree using lazy abstraction paradigm. In addition, lazy abstraction prevents SAVERIA from
bloating and consuming more resource – memory and computation power.
2.2.3 Program lifting into the logical space
SAVERIA models program semantics as symbolic formulas – representing the instructions in
the path as series of logical formulae. Therefore, SAVERIA can use theorem provers [8] to
reason about the behavior of the path and prove the correctness of the program with respect




In this chapter, we introduce the technical details of SAVERIA. On the next sections, we
present the target language in § 3.1 for SAVERIA and the formal logic basis § 3.2 for
SAVERIA. Since CAMPY [9] runs SAVERIA, the target language and formal logic basis
for SAVERIA is same in our previous published work CAMPY [9]. CAMPY uses the output
of SAVERIA as its input. Hence, the sections § 3.1 and § 3.1.2, which are also defined for
SAVERIA, are taken from our previously published work CAMPY [9].
3.1 Target language
In this section, we present the definition of the structure (§ 3.1.1) and semantics (§ 3.1.2) of
the programs that SAVERIA takes as input.
3.1.1 Program structure
A program P is a set of instructions ∆. Each instruction δ ∈ ∆ is a either
• Test statement which tests the program state and creates branches in the program flow
• Update statement which updates the program state
• Invoke statement which calls a procedure
• Return statement which returns from a call.
Let procnms be a space of procedure names; let LocsB, LocsC , and LocsR be disjoint sets
of branch, call, and return control locations, and let the set of all control locations be denoted
Locs = LocsB ∪ LocsC ∪ LocsR, with a distinguished initial location li and final location
lf . Let proc : Locs→ procnms map each control location to the procedure that contains
11
it, with proc(li) = proc(lf ). Let entry : procnms→ Locs map each procedure to its entry
control location and exit : procnms→ Locs map each procedure to its exit control location.
The space of all variables is denoted Vars. The space of all instructions is denoted ∆. For
each control location L ∈ Locs and sequence of locations s ∈ Locs∗, s is an immediate
suffix of L :: s.
A program statement either tests and updates state, calls a procedure, or returns from
a call. A pre-location, instruction, and branch-target-location is a branch statement; i.e.,
the space of branch statements is denoted Brs = LocsB × ∆ × Locs. For each branch
statement b ∈ Brs, the pre-location, instruction, and post-location of b are denoted PreLoc[b],
Instr[b], and BrTgt[b], respectively.
A pre-location, call-target procedure name, and return-target control location are a call
statement; i.e, the space of call statements is denoted Calls = LocsC × procnms× Locs.
For each call statement c ∈ Calls, the pre-location, call target, and return target of c are
denoted PreLoc[c], CallTgt[c], and RetTgt[c], respectively. The call entry point of c is
denoted entry(c) = entry(CallTgt[c]).
A return location represents a return statement; i.e., the space of return statements is
denoted Rets = LocsR.
The space of all statements is denoted Stmts = Brs∪Calls∪Rets. Each control location
is the target of either potentially-many branch statement or exactly one call statement.
For each call statement c ∈ Calls and return statement r ∈ Rets such that CallTgt[c] =
proc(PreLoc[r]), r returns to c. A program P is a set of statements in which for each branch
location L ∈ LocsB and location L′ ∈ Locs, there is at most one branch statement, denoted




Visible execution state of a function call is denoted a store. A run of a program P is a
sequence of stores that are valid along an interprocedural path of P . A nesting relation over
indices models the matched calls and returns of along a control path [10]. For each n ∈ N,
let the space of positive integers less than n be denoted Zn.
Definition 2. For each n ∈ N and ⊆ Zn × Zn such that for all indices i0, i′0, i1, i′1 ∈ Zn
with i0  i′0 and i1  i
′




0, i1 < i
′
1 < i0 < i
′





 is a nesting relation over n.
For each n ∈ N, the nesting relations over Zn are denoted Nestings[n]. For each i, j < n
and nesting relation ∈ Nestings[n], we denote (i, j) ∈ alternatively as i j.
A control path is a sequence of control locations visited by a sequence of branch
statements, calls, and matching returns.
Definition 3. Let program P ∈ L and control locations L = [L0, . . . , Ln−1] ∈ Locs∗ be
such that the following conditions hold.
(1) For each 0 ≤ i < n such that Li ∈ LocsB, there is a branch statement b ∈ P such
that PreLoc[b] = Li and BrTgt[b] = Li+1.
(2) There is a nesting relation ∈ Nestings[n] such that the domain and range of are
exactly the indices of the call and successors of return locations in L. For all 0 ≤ i < j < n
such that i  j + 1, there is some call statement c ∈ P such that Li+1 = entry(c) and
Lj+1 = RetTgt[c], and some return statement r ∈ P such that Lj = PreLoc[r].
Then [L0, . . . , Ln−1] is a path of P .
For each program P ∈ L, the space of paths of P is denoted PATHS[P ], and the set of
all paths is denoted Paths. For each path π ∈ Paths, we denote the locations and nesting
relation of π as Locs[π] and π, respectively.
Let the space of program values be the space of integers; i.e., the space of values is
Values = Z. SAVERIA can verify programs that operate on objects and arrays in addition
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to integers. An evaluation of all variables in Vars is a store; i.e., the space of stores is
Stores = Vars→ Values.
For each instruction δ ∈ ∆, there is a transition relation ρδ ⊆ Stores× Stores. For each
branch statement b ∈ Brs, the transition relation of the instruction in b is denoted ρb =
ρInstr[b]. The transition relation of an instruction need not be total: thus, branch statements
can implement control branches using instructions that act as assume instructions. The
transition relation that relates each store at a callsite to the resulting entry store in a callee is
denotes ρC ⊆ Stores×Stores. The transition relation that relates each calling store, exit store
of a callee, and resulting return store in the caller is denoted ρR ⊆ Stores× Stores× Stores.
For each space X , sequence s ∈ X∗, and all 0 ≤ i < |X|, let the ith element in X be
denoted s[i] ∈ X . Let the first and last elements of s in particular be denoted Head[s] = s[0]
and last[s] = s[|s| − 1].
A run of a program P is a sequence of stores Σ and a path p of equal length, such that
adjacent stores in Σ satisfy transition relations of statements of P at their corresponding
locations in p.
Definition 4. Let P ∈ L be a program, let Σ = σ0, . . . , σn−1 ∈ Stores be a sequence of
stores, and let π ∈ PATHS[P ] be such that |Locs[π]| = n, such that the following conditions
hold:
(1) For each i < n− 1, (σi, σi+1) ∈ ρBrAt[P ](Li,Li+1).
(2) For each i < j < n− 1 such that i j + 1, (σi, σi+1) ∈ ρC , (σi, σj, σj+1) ∈ ρR.
Then Σ is a run of q in P .
For each path π ∈ Paths, the space of runs of π is denoted Runs[π] ⊆ Stores∗.
3.2 Formal logic
Our approach uses formal logic to model the semantics of programs and synthesize sum-
maries to prove or disprove that a given program satisfies a safety formula. A theory is
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a vocabulary of function symbols and a standard model. For each theory T and space of
logical variables X , let the spaces of T terms and formulas over X be denoted Terms[T ](X)
and Forms[T ](X), respectively. For each formula ϕ ∈ Forms[T ](X), the set of variable
symbols that occur in ϕ (i.e., the vocabulary of ϕ) is denoted Voc(ϕ). Each term constructed
by applying only function symbols in T is a ground term of T ; i.e., the space of ground
terms of T is GTerms[T ] = Terms[T ](∅).
For all vectors of variables X = [x0, . . . , xn] and Y = [y0, . . . , yn], the formula con-
straining the equality of each element in X with its corresponding element in Y , i.e., the
formula
∧
0≤i≤n xi = yi, is denoted X = Y . For each vector of terms TY = [t0, . . . , tn], the
repeated replacement of variables ϕ[. . . [t0/x0] . . . tn−1/xn−1] is denoted ϕ[X/TY ]. For
each formula ϕ defined over free variables X , the substitution of Y in ϕ is denoted
ϕ[Y ] ≡ ϕ[Y/X].
A domain is a finite set of values. For each theory T , a model of T is a domain D and a
map from each k-ary function symbol in T to a k-ary function over D. The standard model
of a theory T is a distinguished model of T . The domain of the standard model of T is
denoted Dom[T ].
For theories T0 and T1, T1 is an extension of T0 if the vocabulary of T0 is contained by
the vocabulary of T1 and the standard model of T0 is the restriction of the standard model of
T1 to the vocabulary of T0. For all theories T0 and T1 whose standard models are equal on
all symbols in the common vocabulary of T0 and T1, the combination [11] of theories T0
and T1 is denoted T0 ∪ T1. We only consider theories T with standard model m that maps to
domain D such that for each element d ∈ D, there is a ground term term[d] ∈ GTerms[T ]
such that m(term[d]) = d (e.g., theories of arithmetic), along with their combinations with
the theory of uninterpreted functions (EUFLIA).
For each theory T , formula ϕ ∈ Forms[T ](X), and assignment m of X to the domain
of T , m satisfies ϕ if ϕ evaluates to TRUE under m combined with the standard model
of T (denoted m `T ϕ). For all T formulas ϕ0, . . . , ϕn, ϕ ∈ Forms[T ], we denote that
15
ϕ0, . . . , ϕn entail ϕn as ϕ0, . . . , ϕn |=T ϕ. A T -formula ϕ is a theorem of T if |=T ϕ.
Although determining the satisfiability of formulas in theories required to model the
semantics of practical languages, such as LIA, is NP-complete in general, solvers have
been proposed that often efficiently determine the satisfiability of formulas that arise from
practical verification problems [7]. Our approach assumes access to a decision procedure
for EUFLIA, named EUFLIASAT.
3.2.1 Symbolic Representation of Program Semantics
The semantics of L can be represented symbolically using LIA formulas. In particular, each
program store σ ∈ Stores corresponds to a LIA model over the vocabulary Vars, denoted
mσ. For each space of indices I and index i ∈ I , the space of variables Varsi denotes a
distinct copy of the variables in Vars, as does Vars′, which will typically be used to represent
the post-state of a sequence of transitions. For theory T , the space of program summaries is
Summaries = Forms[T ](Vars,Vars′).
A safety constraint S is an comparison relation over the final stores of Vars. For each
instruction δ ∈ ∆, there is a formula ψ[i] ∈ Forms[LIA](Vars,Vars′) such that for all
stores σ, σ′ ∈ Stores, (σ, σ′) ∈ ρi if and only if mσ,mσ
′ ` ψ[i]. There is a formula
ψC ∈ Forms[LIA](Vars,Vars′) such that for all stores σ, σ ∈ Stores, (σ, σ′) ∈ ρC if and only
if mσ,mσ′ ` ψC . There is a formula ψR ∈ Forms[LIA](Vars0,Vars1,Vars2) such that for all
stores σ0, σ1, σ2 ∈ Stores, (σ0, σ1, σ2) ∈ ρR if and only if mσ0 ,mσ1 ,mσ2 ` ψR.
Each program P and logical formula S over the initial state of P and final state of all
Vars define safety specification problem. The problem is to decide if over each run r of P ,
the initial state of P and the final states of Vars in r satisfy S. For theory T , the space of
safety constraints is denoted Constraints[T ] = Forms[T ](Vars).
Definition 5. For each extension T of LIA, program P ∈ L, safety constraint S ∈
Constraints[T ], and path π ∈ PATHS[P ], if for each run r ∈ Runs[q], it holds that
mHead[r], Stores 7→ mlast[r](Vars) ` S, then q satisfies S. For each path π ∈ PATHS[P ]
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it holds that π satisfies S, then P satisfies S, denoted P ` S. The safety-satisfaction
problem (P , S) is to determine if P ` S.
While we present our verifier SAVERIA for a simple language whose semantics can be
modeled using only LIA, practical languages typically provide features that can only be
directly modeled using LIA in combination with the theories of uninterpreted functions and
the theory of arrays. The complete implementation of SAVERIA supports such language
features (see § 4 ).
3.2.2 Interpolation
Tree-interpolation problems formulate the problem of finding valid invariants for all runs
of a particular program path that contains calls and returns [5]. The branching structure in
the tree-interpolation problem models the dependency of the result of a function call on the
effect of the path through the callee combined with the arguments provided to the callee by
the caller.
Definition 6. For theory T , a T -tree-interpolation problem is a triple (N,E,C) in which:
• N is a set of nodes.
• E ⊆ N × N is a set of edges such that the graph T = (N,E) is a tree with root
r ∈ N .
• C : N → Forms[T ](X) assigns each node to an T constraint.
For each tree-interpolation problem T = (N,E,C), an interpolant of T is an assignment
I : N → Forms[T ](X) from each node to a T formula such that:
• The interpolant at the root r ∈ N of T entails FALSE. I.e., I(r) |=T FALSE.
• For each node n ∈ N , the interpolants at the children of n and the constraint at n
entail the interpolant at n. I.e., {I(m)}(m,n)∈E, C(n) |=T I(n).
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• For each node n, the vocabulary at n is the common vocabulary of all descendants for
n and all non-descendants of n. The vocabulary of the interpolant at n is contained









For theory T and variables X , the space of all tree-interpolation problems whose
constraints are T formulas overX is denoted ITP[T , X]. For each tree-interpolation problem
T ∈ ITP[T , X], the nodes, edges, root, and constraints of P are denoted N[T ], E[T ], r[T ],
and Ctrs[T ], respectively. The conjunction of all constraints in T is denoted Ctr[T ] =∧
n∈N[T ]C(n). A model of Ctr[T ] is referred to alternatively as a model of T .
For each tree-interpolation problem T and node n ∈ N[T ], the tree-interpolation
problem formed by the restriction of T to the subtree with root n is denoted T |n. The
procedure TMRG takes two tree-interpolation problems (N,E,C) and (N ′, E ′, C ′) with
(N ′, E ′) a subtree of (N,E) and constructs a tree-interpolation problem in which the
constraint for each node is the conjunction over constraints for all nodes in N ′. I.e.,
TMRG((N,E,C), (N ′, E ′, C ′)) = (N,E,C ′′) with C ′′(n) = C(n) for each n ∈ N \ N ′
and C ′′(n) = C(n) ∧ C ′(n) for each n ∈ N ′.
Definition 7. For a tree-interpolation problem a cover relation ./⊆ N × N is a tuple in
which:
• M is a mapping function which maps the each n ∈ N to its corresponding control
location L : M(n) = L.
• The path ancestor relation for m,n ∈ π is denoted m @ n where m is an ancestor of
n in a path π if the depth of n is less than the depth of m.
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• The ancestor relation for the nodes pointing same control location M(m) = M(n) in
the tree is denoted m v n where the depth of n is less than the depth of m.
• A node n is covers another node m (denoted (n,m) ∈./) if and only if m v n and
ϕ(m) |= ϕ(n).
When a node is covered, then all of its ancestors in the paths leading to the covered node
are also covered. A node can only be covered by only one node. A covered node cannot
cover others. When a new cover relation added such as (n,m) ∈./, SAVERIA checks if
there are other records in such as (m, ·) ∈./. If such relation exists, then SAVERIA removes
the cover on the covered nodes and their ancestors. Since the invariants are estimated, they
are approximate; hence we cannot establish transitivity on implications.
For theory T and T -interpolation problems U0 and U1 containing the same nodes and
edges, U0 is as weak as U1 if for each node n, the constraint in U0 for n is as weak as
the constraint for n in U1 and the vocabulary of the constraint in U1 is contained by the
vocabulary of the constraint in U0.
Definition 8. For theory T , variables X , and U0, U1 ∈ ITP[T , X], if for N = N[T ] = N[U ],
E[T ] = E[U ], and for each n ∈ N , (1) Ctr[U0](n) |= Ctr[U1](n) and (2) Voc(Ctr[U0](n)) ⊆
Voc(Ctr[U1](n)), then U1 is as weak as U0.
Because weaker interpolation problems have weaker constraints per node, they admit
fewer interpolants.
Lemma 1. For theory T , variables X , all U0, U1 ∈ ITP[T,X] with common nodes N such
that U1 as weak as U0, and all I : N → Forms[T ](X) such that I is an interpolant of U1, I
is an interpolant of U0.
For theory T , an interpolating theorem prover takes a T -interpolation problem T and
returns either a T -model or a map from the nodes of T to T -formulas. An interpolating
theorem prover is sound if it only returns a valid model or interpolant of its input.
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Definition 9. For theory T , variables X , let effective procedure t : ITP[T , X] → (X →
Dom[T ]) ∪ (N[T ] → Forms[T ](X)) be such that for each tree-interpolation problem
U ∈ ITP[T , X], (1) if t(U) : X → Dom[T ], then t(U) is a model of U ; (2) if t(U) :
N[T ] → Forms[T ](X), then t(U) are interpolants of U . Then t is a sound interpolating
theorem prover for T .
Previous work has presented an algorithm EUFLIAITP that solves a given EUFLIA
tree-interpolation problem T by invoking an interpolating theorem prover for EUFLIA a
number of times bounded by |N[T ]| [5].
In § 3.3, we describe an approach for proving that a program whose semantics are
expressed in a theory T0 satisfies a constraint expressed in an extension T . To simplify the
presentation of our approach, we fix T0 to be LIA, and fix T to be an arbitrary extension of
LIA. However, our approach can be applied using any theory for T0 that satisfies the above
conditions: in particular, our actual implementation of SAVERIA uses the combination of
the theories of linear arithmetic, uninterpreted functions with equality, and arrays as its base
theory.
3.3 Program Modelling
In this section, we describe a safety property verifier SAVERIA which CAMPY, a complexity
verification tool, [9] is built on. CAMPY [9] takes the output of the SAVERIA which is a tree
interpolation problem and performs complexity analysis on the paths indicated unsafe by
SAVERIA. For complexity analysis, CAMPY adds axioms to the erroneous path, and then
CAMPY either approves the result of SAVERIA or decides the path is safe. In § 3.3.1, we
define the space of the summaries that SAVERIA deduce to prove given a program satisfies a
given constraint. In § 3.3.2, we introduce the property verification algorithm for SAVERIA.
Once again, the section § 3.3.1 are taken from our previously published work CAMPY [9]




SAVERIA, given a program P and safety constraint S, attempts to infer summaries of the
behavior of P that imply that all paths of P satisfy S. A program summary is a map from
each control location L to a symbolic summary of the effects of all runs from the entry point
of L’s procedure to L. The space of program summaries is denoted ProgSums = Locs→
Summaries. Program summaries are inductive for P and S if they imply that all runs of P
satisfy S.
Definition 10. For program P ∈ L and safety constraint S ∈ Constraints[T ], let Φ ∈
ProgSums, be such that:
(1) for each procedure f ∈ procnms,
Vars = Vars′ |= Φ(entry(f))
(2) Φ(lf ) |= Constraints[T ];
(3) For each branch statement b ∈ P ,
Φ(PreLoc[b])[Vars0,Vars1], ψ[b][Vars1,Vars2] |=
Φ(BrTgt[b])[Vars0,Vars2]




Then Φ are inductive summaries for P and S.
The space of inductive summaries for program P ∈ L and safety constraint S ∈
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Constraints[T ] is denoted Ind[P , S]. Inductive summaries are evidence of safety constraint
satisfaction.
Lemma 2. For each program P ∈ L and constraint S ∈ Constraints[T ], if there are
inductive summaries Φ ∈ Ind[P , S], then P ` S.
For path π, a visible suffix of π is a sequence of locations in π connected over only
branch edges, nesting edges, and return edges.
Definition 11. For each path π ∈ Paths, let L ∈ Locs∗ be such that last[L] = lf and
there is some function m : Z|L| → Z|π| such that for each 0 ≤ i < |L|, L[i] = π[m(i)], if
L[i] ∈ LocsB or L[i] ∈ LocsR, then L[i + 1] = π[m(i) + 1], and if L[i] ∈ LocsC , then for
j < |π| such that i π j, L[i+ 1] = π[j]. Then L is a visible suffix of π.
For each path π ∈ Paths, let the space of visible suffixes of π be denoted Suffixes[π] ⊆
Locs∗. For program P ∈ L, the visible suffixes of all paths of P are denoted Suffixes[P ] =⋃
π∈PATHS[P] Suffixes[π].
Path summaries are sets of visible suffixes of a program’s paths, with each visible suffix
s mapped to a summary of the effect of all runs of s.
Definition 12. For program P ∈ L, let Q ⊆ Suffixes[P ] be visible suffixes of paths of P ,
and let Φ : Q→ Summaries. Then (Q,Φ) are visible suffix summaries of P .
For programP ∈ L, the space of all visible suffix summaries ofP is denoted VisSums[P ].
For all visible suffix summaries Φ ∈ VisSums[P ], the visible suffixes and summary map of
Φ are denoted Suffixes[Φ] and Sums[Φ].
If visible suffix summaries soundly model the semantics of the paths of which the
summaries are subsequences, then the summaries are valid.
Definition 13. For program P ∈ L, let visible-suffix summaries Φ ∈ VisSums[P ] be
such that for each visible suffix s ∈ Suffixes[Φ], (1) for each procedure f ∈ procnms, if
Head[s] = entry(f), then
Vars = Vars′ |= Sums[Φ](s)
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(3) and each call statement c ∈ P such that s0 = PreLoc[c] :: s ∈ Suffixes[Φ] and return




Path summaries define inductive summaries of P when they define summaries of all
paths of P .
Definition 14. For each program P ∈ L and constraint S ∈ Constraints[T ], let Φ ∈




{Sums[Sum](t) | t ∈ Suffixes[S],Head[t] = L}
If Φ′ are inductive summaries for P and S (Defn. 10), then Φ are inductive visible-suffix
summaries for P and S.
SAVERIA attempts to prove that a given program P satisfies a given safety property S
by inferring inductive visible-suffix summaries for P and S.
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Input :A program P ∈ L and safety specification S ∈ Constraints[T ].
Output :A decision as to whether P satisfies S.
1 Procedure SAVERIA(P , S)
2 Procedure SAUX(Φ)
3 switch UNWIND[P ](Φ) do
4 case TRUE: do return TRUE ;
5 case π: do
6 switch REFINE[P , S](π,Φ) do
7 case FALSE: do return FALSE ;
8 case Φ: do
9 COVER[P ](Φ) ;





15 return SAUX((∅, ∅)) ;
Algorithm 1: SAVERIA: a safety verifier. SAVERIA uses procedures UNWIND[P ],
REFINE[[, ]P, S], and COVER[P ] which are described in § 3.3.2.
3.3.2 Program Verification Algorithm
Alg. 1 shows pseudo-code for the main algorithm of SAVERIA which takes a program P
and a safety constraint S (line 1) to show whether P satisfies S. SAVERIA is based on
counter-example guided refinement loop approach as in [2, 3]. SAVERIA uses SAUX (line 2
— line 14 )function which takes the visible summaries Φ. SAUX calls three core algorithms
which are UNWIND (line 3), REFINE (line 6) and COVER (line 9) functions. First, SAVERIA
checks that if Φ summarizes the program P . If so, UNWIND returns true, and SAVERIA
halts and returns TRUE (line 4) to indicate P satisfies S. Otherwise, UNWIND returns a path
π ∈ P such that Φ does not summarize. Then, SAVERIA calls REFINE (line 6) procedure to
to generate interpolants and refine path invariants along the path π. If, REFINE functions
returns either FALSE or visible suffix summaries Φ. If it returns FALSE, then SAVERIA
halts and returns FALSE (line 7) to indicate that P does not satisfy S. Otherwise, SAVERIA
takes Φ and calls the COVER (line 9) function to check the cover relation over updated Φ by
REFINE.
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Input :Visible suffix summaries Φ.
Output :TRUE to indicate Φ summarizes the program P , or a path π ∈ P not
summarized by Φ.
1 Procedure UNWIND[P ](Φ)
2 Procedure UNWINDAUX(expq, ./)
3 if expq = ∅ then return TRUE;
4 n := expq.pop() ;
5 if (·, n) 6∈ ./ ∨(·, (n @ ·)) 6∈ ./ then
6 if (Tgt[M(m)]× ρi × PreLoc[M(n)]) = ∅ then
7 ϕ(n) := TRUE ;
8 return πn ;
9 else
10 forall (Tgt[M(m)]× ρi × PreLoc[M(n)]) do
11 πm :=m −→ρi πn ;





17 return UNWINDAUX(expq, ./) ;
Algorithm 2: UNWIND[P ] procedure takes the visible suffix summaries Φ, and returns ei-
ther (1) TRUE to indicate the program is safe or (2) a path π ∈ P which is not summarized
by Φ.
Alg. 2 presents pseudo-code for the algorithm of UNWIND[P ]. UNWIND[P ] defines and
uses the procedure UNWINDAUX (line 2 — line 16) the takes expansion queue expq, and
the cover relation set ./ of the program P . expq contains nodes n ∈ N to expand Locs ∈ P
into π ∈ PATHS[P ]. First, UNWINDAUX checks if there is any node in expq to expand
(line 3). If expq is empty, then UNWINDAUX returns true (line 3) to indicate that all paths
π ∈ PATHS[P ] is summarized by the visible suffixes Φ. Otherwise, UNWINDAUX takes
the first none n in the expansion queue (line 4, and checks whether n is covered (line 5).
If n is directly covered by another node, or any of its descendants are covered, then n is
not expanded. If n is not covered, UNWINDAUX checks if M(n) is the initial location
(line 6). If n is the initial location, then the label for n is assigned as TRUE (line 7), and
UNWINDAUX returns a unique path (line 8). If n is not covered, a node m is created for
each location which are previous locations of M(n) in the CFG (line 10). An edge is created
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Input :A path π ∈ P , and visible suffix summaries Φ.
Output :FALSE to indicate π does not satisfy S, or visible suffix summaries Φ of P .
1 Procedure REFINE[P , S](π,Φ)
2 Procedure REFINEAUX(./)
3 if I(π ∧ ¬S) = FALSE then
4 forall n ∈ π do
5 ϕ(n)
′
:= ϕ(n) ∨ I(n) ;
6 if ϕ(n)′ 6|= ϕ(n) then
7 ./ := ./ \(·, n) ;
8 expq.push(n) ;
9 end
10 ϕ(n) := ϕ(n)
′ ;
11 end
12 return Φ ;
13 else return FALSE ;
14 return REFINEAUX(./) ;
Algorithm 3: REFINE[P , S,] procedure takes a path π and the visible suffix summaries Φ
of P , and returns either (1) FALSE if there is no inductive summaries of the path π or (2)
visible suffix summaries Φ of P merged with the inductive summaries of π.
which contains the transitions ρi from m to n (line 11). The label of m is assigned to FALSE
(line 12), and m is pushed into the expansion queue (line 13).
Alg. 3 presents pseudo-code for the algorithm of REFINE[P , S]. REFINE[P , S] defines
and uses the procedure REFINEAUX (line 2 — line 13) which takes the cover relation. First,
REFINEAUX checks whether the path π is safe or not (line 3). REFINEAUX takes a path
and the negation of the safety property. Interpolants for the path π is generated by a theorem
prover [12]. The result of the generated interpolants is either (1) FALSE to prove that the
path π ∧ ¬S is infeasible or (2) TRUE to prove π ∧ ¬S is feasible. If the path is safe, the
final program state does not end with the error state ¬S. Let the initial location and the final
location in a path are donated li and lf respectively. In this case, all nodes in the path π
are traversed from M(m) = li through M(n) = lf (line 4 — line 11). The disjunction of
the current invariant of the node n and the generated interpolant for n (line 5) is compared
with the current invariant (line 6). If the disjunction is weaker than the current invariant,
n’s covered by information is removed from cover relation. The node n is pushed again
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Input :A program P ∈ L and safety specification S ∈ Constraints[T ].
Output :A decision as to whether P satisfies S.
1 Procedure COVER[P ](Φ)
2 Procedure COVERAUX(N, ./)
3 forall n ∈ N do
4 forall m v n do
5 if (·,m) 6∈ ./ ∨(·, (m @ ·) 6∈ ./ then
6 if ϕ(m) |= ϕ(n) then
7 ./ := ./ ∪(n,m) ;





13 return COVERAUX(N, ./)
Algorithm 4: COVER[P ] takes the visible suffix summaries Φ and maintains the cover
relation of the nodes n ∈ N .
to expand, if there is any direct ancestor left to expand (line 8). Note that, pushing into
expansion queue is performed for all nodes m @ n where any m has at least one ancestor
left unexpanded.
Alg. 4 contains pseudo-code for the algorithm of COVER[P ]. COVER[P ] defines and
uses the procedure COVERAUX (line 2 — line 12) which takes the nodes of path-invariant
tree. First, for all nodes n ∈ N , COVERAUX traverses all nodes m v n (line 4 — line 11).
For a node m such that m or any of its descendants is not covered (line 5), COVERAUX
performs an implication check whether n is weaker than m (line 6). If m is stronger than n,
then n covers m and this relation is added to the cover relation (line 7. Since a covered node
cannot cover others, the relation for m covers others are removed from the cover relation.
For the nodes covered by m, since they are not covered anymore, they are pushed into the





In this chapter, we will talk about the empirical results for CAMPY. In § 4.1, we will present
our test environment. In § 4.2, we will discuss the results presented in Table 4.1 which is
taken from CAMPY [9].
4.1 Test Environment
All the experiments are performed on the machine with the following properties
• 16 cores
• 1.4 GHz
• 132 GB RAM
4.2 Evaluation
We have collected variety of benchmarks from various online coding exercise and challenge
platforms [13, 14, 15]. Since our final product is CAMPY, only CAMPY is experimented on
the benchmarks and its performance measurements are collected. In Table 4.1, performance
measurements both time and memory are shown. The correctness of results and perfor-
mance measurements for CAMPY promises its applicability. Considering CAMPY performs
additional computation over the output of SAVERIA, SAVERIA requires even less time and
memory. This makes SAVERIA worth to provide as a tool which other tools can be plugged
in SAVERIA as CAMPY.
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Table 4.1: The results of evaluating CAMPY. Each benchmark program is associated with two rows: the first row contains data for
verifying that the program satisfies the tightest bound found; the second row contains data for verifying that the program does not satisfy
the looses bound found. The column titled “Name” contains the benchmark’s name; the column titled “LoC” contains the number of
lines of source code; the column titled “Loops” contains the number of loops in the benchmark; the column titled “Nesting.” contains the
maximum nesting depth of loops in the benchmark. The column titled “Bound” contains the bound provided to CAMPY. Under heading
“Performance”, the column titled “Time” contains the time used by CAMPY; the column titled “Memory” contains the peak amount of
memory used by CAMPY. “-” indicates that CAMPY timed out on the benchmark and did not return a definite result.
Program Structure Bound PerformanceName LoC Loops Nesting Time (s) Mem (MB)
Array2 39 4 2 n
2 5.3 12.4
n 5.7 13.3
BirthdayCandles 43 4 2 t · n 3.1 15.7
t 2.9 14.4
Bit 61 2 2 n
2 2.8 13.6
n 3.1 13.6
CodeChefJava 45 4 2 3 · t · s 3.2 46.0
t 2.9 36.0
DRGNBOOL 51 3 2 n · (a+ b) 5.1 25.4
(a+ b) 3.3 14.5
FibonacciIterative 18 1 1 n 2.7 13.8
10 3.3 14.1
Ideone 42 2 2 n · a 3.5 15.1
n 2.6 13.4
JewelAndStone 37 3 3 t · x · y 4.6 15.2
x · y 3.0 13.8
Jewel2 40 3 2 350 · t 3.5 16.8
10 3.1 13.3
LIS 47 3 2 n · (log n) 3.4 14.6
n 2.8 13.1
Loops 1 30 2 2 t · n 3.4 36.0
n 2.8 34.0
Pie 34 3 2 t · 2n 2.9 14.1
t · n 3.1 13.8
Scroll 58 3 2 t · (log a+ log b) 3.1 13.6
t 2.9 16.1
SmartSieve 31 2 2 n
2 + log n 4.4 20.2
10 3.7 18.1
Sweet 125 2 2 t · n 3.5 14.2
n 6.4 20.5
Test0 22 2 1 n 2.7 13.1
10 2.9 13.1
Test1 45 3 2 2 · t · n 3.7 15.2
n 3.2 12.8
Test2 36 3 2 n · t 3.8 13.9
n 3.2 13.1
Test3 40 4 2 3 · t · n 4.3 10.6
n 3.1 10.8
Test4 37 3 2 c · n 3.1 14.7
c 3.8 16.1
Test5 77 6 3 t · (n+ n
2) 3.4 54.8
n2 2.8 138.0
Test6 36 4 3 n





We have presented and automated property verifier, SAVERIA, which can prove whether a
program satisfies the desired property. Since CAMPY runs on SAVERIA, the correctness of
CAMPY relies on SAVERIA. If SAVERIA does not work properly, then it is not expected
for CAMPY to work as expected. The soundness and correctness of CAMPY implies that
SAVERIA is sound as a verification tool. The success of CAMPY thrives us to extend




There are plenty of extensions can be developed in the future to improve the security and
privacy for software written in Java programming language. The common feature of all
these extensions are to find bugs, detect vulnerabilities (by implementation or design) and
disclose malicious behaviours.
• DoS Attack Vulnerability Detection: Using current complexity verifier and safety
checker, upon modelling the current synchronization in Android [16] is possible to
detect the entry points to critical paths which could lead to freezing and eventually
DoS attacks in Android.
• Partial Information Leakage Detection: Given set of sensitive information and leak
functions, it is possible to extend the current safety verifier to detect whole even partial
information leakage. The leak detection would be able to detect for only the given
sensitive information source and leak vectors.
• Cross Channel Attacks Based on Timing: It is possible to gain information about
program behaviour or whether the inputs are sensitive or not based on the runtime of
the program on different inputs.
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